While social identities have long been shown to influence political attitudes and behaviors, this paper asks the reverse. Are political identities ever strong enough to influence identification and involvement with a deep-seated identity? Looking at an identity that has become an increasingly strong predictor of partisanship and vote choice, religion, I develop a theory that there is a time period in an individual's life when a fully-formed political identity can have a meaningful effect on a weak religious identity. Using an experiment and two panel studies to test my theory, I find that when people are in the process of raising children-a time that pulls many back into the religious fold-their partisanship can change key aspects of their religious identity. Although many bemoan religion's role in creating a polarized political arena, this blame may be unfairly assigned as partisans themselves help produce an increasingly polarized electorate. * For comments, suggestions, and feedback, I thank Adam Berinsky, Anthony Fowler, Gabe Lenz, Charles Stewart III, Justin de Benedictis-Kessner, Matthew Levendusky, Krista Loose, Marc Meredith, Diana Mutz, Ethan Porter, Michael Sances, and Adam Ziegfeld.
Scholars of identity politics have long asked how deep-seated social identities affect political attitudes. In the American context, a venerable line of research has shown how race (Kinder and Sanders 1996) , social class (Brooks and Manza 1997; Hout, Brooks, and Manza 1995; Lipset 1981) , and gender (Verba, Scholzman and Brady 1995) shape political attitudes, identities, and allegiances. These social identities are often taken as fixed in their salience and largely impervious to political influence. Yet, much research across political science and allied disciplines has shown that the strength of social identities varies across different times, places, and social contexts (Chandra 2001; Kasfir 1979; Posner 2005; Waters 1990 ). Furthermore, a long line of scholarship in American politics demonstrates that partisanship can, itself, be an important and meaningful identity (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Gerber and Huber 2010; . Is it therefore possible that, under certain conditions, political identities influence an individual's social identities?
To begin to answer this question, I focus on one identity often touted as one of the primary drivers of contemporary political attitudes in the United States: religion. Republicans, on average, attend church more regularly and are more likely to identify with a religious faith than Democrats. A common explanation for this gap in the religiosity of partisan groups, often known as the "God gap", is that the highly devout have sorted into the Republican Party, while the less religious and secular have joined the Democratic ranks. But, might there not be another explanation? If political identities are potentially very strong and the salience of an individual's religious identity waxes and wanes over the course of her lifetime, might the former ever influence the latter? This paper theorizes when a person's political identity might impact her religious identity and provides evidence in support of the theory's observable implications.
I begin by presenting a novel, yet intuitive, theory that explains why political identities can influence religious identities. In brief, the development of religious and political identities occurs at different periods in an individual's life, and the distinct timings of the two socialization processes create a window during which partisanship can shape identification with and involvement in the religious sphere. I then offer three empirical tests of my theory, one experimental and two observational. In each, I show that the contemporary political landscape-one which links the Republicans to traditional religious values and the Democrats to more secular and liberal religious beliefs-can affect partisans' religious identifications and behaviors. Importantly, the relative strength of religious and political identities' matters, as all three sets of results are driven by individuals at a life stage when religious identities tend to be weak and open to outside influence.
The theory and empirics make three contributions. First, this paper highlights the need for American politics scholars to consider how politically-relevant social identities are formed and made salient, as political identities may actually affect membership strength under certain circumstances. Second, building on Huddy's claim that social identities have variable strength (2001), the paper shows that researchers miss important nuances when they assume that identities are fixed and stable. And third, the paper presents a new way of thinking about the contemporary religious and political landscape. Religion becoming increasingly intertwined in politics does more than change the political landscape; it also changes the religious make up of America.
A life cycle theory of religion and politics
Although previous work has suggested that political identities can shape religious involvement (Hout and Fischer 2014; 2002; Patrikios; Putnam and Campbell 2010) , the empirical findings are limited and do not offer expectations about when political identities should shape religious outlooks.
1 I fill in this hole by developing a theory, which brings together the religious and political socialization literatures, that predicts when we should expect political 1 While Hout and Fischer (2002) open the door to the question by showing that the increases in religious non-identification comes from the rise of the Religious Right in the 1980s, concerns about omitted variable bias and reverse causation limit the inferences they can make with their cross-sectional data. Further, previous empirical work lacks a generalizable theory. Putnam and Campbell (2010) were surprised when they find that religious responses shifted over a two-wave panel to be consistent with their partisanship: "We were initially skeptical of this finding, since it seemed implausible that people would hazard the fate of their eternal soul over mundane political controversies" (145).
identities to influence religious identities.
The religious life course
For most individuals, religious identification and beliefs are dynamic, not static. Sociologists, developmental psychologists, and scholars of religion have noted that as people develop and age, their relationship with both formal religious institutions and their own personal beliefs change (Argue, Johnson, and White 1999; Chaves 1991; Hoge, Johnson, and Luidens 1993; Ingersoll-Dayton, Krause, and Morgan 2002; Roof 1993; Wilson and Sherkat 1994) .
The sociological "religious life cycle" theory begins with the observation that teenagers and young adults distance themselves from both the religion in which they were raised and religious practice in general (Arnett and Jensen 2002; Desmond, Morga, and Kikuchi 2010; Gallup and Castelli 1989; Hoge, Johnson, and Luidens 1993; Hunsberger and Brown 1984; Roof 1993; Smith 2009; Uecker, Regnerus, and Vaaler 2007; Willits and Crider, 1989; Wilson and Sherkat 1994; Wuthnow 2007) .
2 Across multiple generations, young adults are the least likely to identify with a religious tradition, attend religious services, pray, and report religion being an important part of their lives (Smith 2009) . Other studies have shown that Mainline Protestant, Catholic, Mormon, and Jewish faiths all lose more members during this life stage than any other single period (Albrecht, Cornwall, and Cunningham 1988; Hoge, Johnson, and Luidens 1993; Uecker, Regnerus, and Vaaler 2007) . Across generations and communities, young adults' religious identities are noticeably weaker than at other points in their lives.
2 There are many sociological explanations for why young adults leave religion. First, leaving home, changing peer groups, and adopting new roles and responsibilities often result in cutting ties with childhood religious institutions (Goldscheider and Goldscheider 1999; Hoge, Johnson, and Luidens 1993) . These transitions automatically place young adults on the outskirts of organized religion. Second, young adults willfully assert their independence from their parents' religious beliefs and practices (Arnett and Jensen 2002; Smith 2009 ). In fact, church attendance decreases most dramatically among young adults who attended religious services regularly as children and who have parents who regularly attend (Petts 2009 ). Third, Smith (2009) argues that the cognitive dissonance that comes from the young adults' exposure to and experimentation with binge drinking (Perkins 1987) , drug use (Engs and Mullen 1999) , and premarital sex (Zaleski and Schiaffino 2000) pushes young adults away from religion. A final, more passive, reason for decreased religiosity among young adults is that they simply lose interest or are too busy with other activities. For many, the decline in religiosity is not a concerted decision, but rather an unintended eventuality once given free rein over their time (Dinges et al. 1998; Smith 2009 ).
As these young people emerge into full adulthood, which often begins with starting a family (Chaves 2011) , they must decide whether to remain on the outskirts of religion or re-enter the religious realm. Sociologists note that getting married (Hadaway and Roof 1988; Roof 1993; Sandominsky and Wilson 1990) and having children (Argue, Johnson, and White 1999; Arnett and Jensen 2002; Gallup and Castelli 1989; Ingersoll-Dayton, Krause, and Morgan 2002; Wilson and Sherkat 1994; Wuthnow 2007 ) are strongly associated with increased church attendance, and that religious participation peaks when married couples have school-age children (Argue, Johnson, and White 1999; Stolzenberg, Blair-Loy, and Waite 1995) . Scholars claim that these parents re-embrace religion to provide the next generation with a religious upbringing.
Despite the tendency to return to religion, newly minted adults do not necessarily raise the next generation in the same way in which they were raised. Instead, individuals accept and reject religious beliefs and practices that suit their needs and are consistent with their pre-existing attitudes and identities (Arnett and Jensen 2002; Newport 1979; Sherkat and Wilson 1994; Stump 1984) . And although certain life events tend to move people out of religion (like divorce) or toward religion (like death of a loved one or serious illness), an adult's resultant religious identity-measured by beliefs and participation-remain stable over time (Dillon and Wink 2007) .
The upper panel of Figure 1 presents a visual illustration of the religious life cycle model.
The socialization process creates a window in adolescence and early adulthood when many people's religious identities are relatively weak. While in this window, however, other aspects of a young adult's identity continue to grow and develop, which can subsequently impact religious decisions as individuals transition into adulthood. One potential influence is politics.
The political life course
The political socialization literature explains how political attitudes first form and to what extent these early attitudes affect opinions and ideas later in life. Though party identification is largely stable during adulthood (Abramson 1979; Alwin, Cohen, and Newcomb 1991; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Sears 1983; Sears and Funk 1990) , scholars have explored when these political identifications solidify. This process does not happen overnight but occurs as individuals grow, learn, and engage with the political sphere.
The "impressionable years" hypothesis claims-as the name suggests-that adolescents and young adults are highly "impressionable." During this time, outside influences and events shape long-term political outlooks, such as political identification (Abramson 1979; Sears 1990; 1975) .
3 Adolescents' partisanship can be affected both by their parents' political leanings (Beck and Jennings 1991; Chaffee, McCleod, and Wackman 1973; Jennings and Niemi 1981; 1974; Niemi and Jennings 1990; Tedin 1974 ) as well as current events and the political climate of the day (Alwin, Cohen and Newcomb 1991; Beck 1974; Firebaugh and Chen 1995; Green, Palmquist and Schickler 2002) . The events affecting those coming of age can be both large in scale, such as the Vietnam War or the September 11th terrorist attacks, or regularly occurring political events, such as campaigns and elections. Political campaigns boil down complex issues into simple, digestible ideas and allows adolescents to sort out their political leanings in the process of becoming a partisan (Sears and Valentino 1997) .
4
The resultant partisanship from this socialization process is more than just a stable affiliation with a political party; it is a powerful identity in its own right that often lasts a lifetime (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002) and influences other relevant attitudes and behaviors. Partisanship shapes responses to survey questions asking about the economy 3 The hypothesis distinguishes itself from previous socialization theories by recognizing that core beliefs are largely stable over the course of one's adult life, while also conceding that attitudes can change a great deal during childhood and early adolescence (Jennings and Niemi 1984; 1981; Vaillancourt 1973) .
4 Related to the impressionable years hypothesis, a generational effect occurs when people in the same age cohort experience similar, "historical, social, cultural, and political experiences" at the same period in their lives (Delli Carpini 1989) . The result is groups of otherwise different individuals having a more similar outlook than they otherwise would due to the time in which they came of age (Sears 1990) . (Bartels 2002; , levels of trust in the government (Keele 2005) , and feelings about the fairness of elections (Sances and Stewart 2012) . Gerber and Huber (2010; even show that partisanship drives consumption behavior and self-reported spending decisions. All told, partisan identification develops in adolescence and young adulthood, is quite stable throughout adulthood, and can produce meaningful changes in the attitudes and behaviors of partisans. The lower panel of Figure 1 presents the political socialization timeline.
Predictions within the American political landscape
The two panels in Figure 1 Republicans and Democrats to move? Republicans are painted as the party aligned with religious groups and the champion of morally conservative issues (Bolce and De Maio 2002; 2014) , while the Democratic Party has taken liberal positions on issues related to morality and religion since the early 1970s (Layman 2001) . These cues, provided by both politicians and the media, have subsequently affected partisans' views. Voters are more likely to clas-sify evangelical Christians and religious people as Republicans and seculars as Democrats (Campbell, Layman, and Green 2011) , and they are more likely to view the Republican Party as "friendlier" toward religion than the Democratic Party (Pew 2009). Consequently, if partisans were to update their religious identity to be consistent with their partisanship, Republicans would become more religious, while Democrats would become less religious.
Below I present three empirical tests of the life cycle theory. In the analyses, all respondents were born in the United States. Individuals raised in another country experienced different socialization processes, and the same theoretical expectations may not apply. In the next section, I present an experiment whose purpose is to estimate directly how political identification can influence religious identification.
Partisan identity priming experiment
The goal of the experiment is straightforward: prime an individual's partisan identity. Prim- 
Research design
The two-wave experiment took place in August 2013 using a diverse national sample.
5 In the first wave of the survey, I collected party identification. The experimental portion of the study took place two weeks later using 1,230 respondents. In the beginning of the second wave, respondents were randomly assigned to a treatment or control condition.
6
In order to prime partisan identities, treated respondents rated the aesthetics of three flyers advertising a voter registration and political engagement drive put on by the fictitious Ohio Voters' Council. Self-identified Democrats and Democratic leaners in wave 1 rated flyers for a Democratic event, while self-identified Republicans and Republican leaners rated flyers for a Republican version of the event.
7 Respondents rated the flyers in three headto-head match ups. For each comparison, respondents were asked to choose which flyer was easier to read, which flyer made the event seem more attractive, and which flyer the respondent preferred overall. I present the flyers and experimental text in the Appendix.
The experimental stimulus is a weak treatment whose purpose is only to remind individuals of their partisan identities, but does not make reference to specific policies, politicians, or groups linked to one of the parties. And importantly, there is no mention of religion or morality politics. After answering the final question of the section, respondents moved on to the next part of the study which asked a series of attitudinal and behavioral questions. The main dependent variable-religious identity-was asked among other demographic questions 5 The sample was obtained through Survey Sampling International (SSI). SSI recruits participants through online communities, social networks, and website ads, and makes efforts to recruit hard-to-reach groups, such as ethnic minorities and seniors. Potential participants are then screened and invited into the panel. When deploying a particular survey, SSI randomly selects panel participants for survey invitations. I did not employ quotas but asked SSI to recruit a target population that matched the (18 and over) census population on education, gender, age, geography, and income. The resulting sample is not a probability sample but is a diverse national sample. Numerous studies using sample from SSI have been published recently in political science (Berinsky, Margolis, and Sances 2014; Kam 2012; Malhotra and Margalit 2010; Malhotra, Margalit, and Mo 2013) .
6 I randomly assigned subjects into the treatment conditions at the beginning of Wave 2 which reduces concerns related to panel attrition and internal validity.
7 Pure Independents in the political priming condition were randomly assigned to one of the two party primes.
later in the survey.
8
The dependent variable is a four-point measure of religious identification strength based on two questions. Respondents first answered a standard religious identification question, and then one follow-up question based on their initial response. If the respondent identifies with a religion, she receives a follow up that asks whether or not she identifies strongly or not strongly with the religion.
9 Approximately 40% of religious identifiers classify themselves as "weak" identifiers while 60% think of themselves as "strong" identifiers. For the roughly 23% of respondents who do not identify with any religion, they are asked: "Do you think of yourself as closer to one particular religion over another?" and are given the same response options as the initial identification question along with an option that they do not feel any closer to one particular religion. A full quarter of respondents who initially said that they did not identify with a religious tradition "leaned" toward one religion. The result is a four-point scale of religious identification, ranging from 0 (strong non-identifier) to 1 (strong identifier).
This paper is first and foremost interested in testing whether the relative strengths of different identities vary depending on a person's position within the life cycle. To do so, I
focus on two subsamples. First, I look at individuals with school-aged children, as they are theoretically the most likely to have weak religious identities that are open to partisanship's influence. Second, I look at individuals with grown children, whose solidified religious identities should make them more immune to external influence. Full parametric results for the full sample, subsamples, other measures of religious identity, and models that include control variables are in the Appendix.
8 As a manipulation check, I also asked respondents attitudinal questions about whether more religious people should run for office and whether the political parties focus too much or not enough on religion. Primed partisans were more likely to move toward the extreme-Democrats wanting less religion in politics and Republicans wanting more. Half of the respondents received these questions before the religious identification question and half answered the questions after. There is no systematic difference in dependent variable based on when they answered these questions about religion in the public sphere.
9 For example, if a respondent identifies as Catholic, her follow-up would read: "Do you identify strongly as a Catholic or not very strongly as a Catholic?" If a respondent identified as an "other" religion, the religion she specified in the open-ended box was carried over to the follow-up question.
Priming partisanship results
The top panels of Figure Importantly, this divergence is not driven by strong partisans and occurs among Democrats 10 65% of Republicans reporting that they are a strong identifier, compared to 48% of Democrats.
11 The corresponding p-value comes from a difference-in-difference model testing whether the treatment affected Republicans and Democrats differently.
12 The parametric test involves a triple interaction model that includes treatment condition, partisanship, and parental status.
and Republicans alike. Although there is not enough data to fully explore the treatment effects using a seven-point party identification measure, the treatment effects found among strong partisans are noticeably smaller than the effects for weak partisans and partisan leaners. In fact, re-running the analyses excluding strong identifiers actually increases both the magnitude and statistical significance of the results. Religious updating is not only occurring among extreme partisans. Moreover, I find symmetric results indicating that Republicans and Democrats both contributed to the increased identity gap.
The controlled experiment provides a direct test of whether and when partisanship might influence religious identification. Despite being a weak test of politics' influence, I find partisans updating their religious identity to be "consistent" with their partisan identity at a certain point in their lives. The experiment, however, leaves two questions unanswered. 
Testing partisanship's influence using two panel studies
Observational studies have explored how aspects of a person's religious identity have come to influence political behaviors. In particular, attendance at religious services (generally referred to as church attendance) became an important predictor of Republican support for the first time beginning in the 1980s (Layman 1997 ) and continues today (Green 2010 ).
Higher levels of church attendance, within any denomination, are positively correlated with Republican identification and vote choice.
In the next sections I use panel data to test whether part of this increased correlation arose from political identities influencing church attendance. Church attendance is an outward sign of and a common proxy for religious identity, and sociologists' religious life cycle work has focused on involvement in churches-particularly being members and attending (Argue, Johnson, and White 1999; Chaves and Schleifer 2014; Stolzenberg, Blair-Loy, and Waite 1995) . Church attendance is also asked in both data sets, which allows for comparability. I discuss and replicate the main results for other dataset-specific variables in the Appendix.
I identify two cases, one in the 1970s and one in 2004, when scholars have found evidence of voters receiving clear signals distinguishing the parties on the basis of religiosity or morality politics. Although the sample composition differs and the data are collected decades apart, the empirical strategy for both cases is similar. In both cases, I measure whether an individual's partisanship-measured years before-changes her reported church attendance over time.
13
Although the panel data reduce concerns about reverse causation and omitted variable bias that plague cross-sectional research, the strategy is not an inferential panacea. A first concern is that individuals may change their partisanship over time and not just their religiosity. Despite the literature noting that partisanship is stable, even over long periods of time and in the wake of political turmoil (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002) , partisanship is not wholly fixed. That said, time lags are more likely to mask an effect rather than exaggerate it.
14 The more variation there is in partisanship, the harder it will be to detect an effect. As an added measure, however, I run two robustness checks on all the results. First, I
replicate the results with a restricted sample using only respondents whose answers on partisanship remained the same across the two survey waves. Second, I replicate the results using previous measures of partisanship (X t−1 ) as an instrument for present-day partisanship (X).
Although both strategies offer their own problems, these alternative specifications produce 13 I run change models that includes a lagged dependent variable rather than models that use a differenced dependent variable because the differenced specification assumes that the lagged dependent variable (Y t−1 ) does not influence either the dependent variable at time t (Y t ) or the change in dependent variable across the survey waves (∆Y) (Finkel 1995; Morgan and Winship 2007) . It is highly improbable that partisanship or church attendance at one point in time is uncorrelated with a change in these variables over time. As a robustness check, however, I also ran the models using a differenced DV approach and find similar results.
14 For example, if a nonchurch-attending Democrat in time t becomes a frequently-attending Republican by time t+1, my data would show a time t Democrat becoming more religious between times t and t + 1. This goes against the theoretical expectation. similar results to the main findings presented.
A second concern relates to the generalizability of these findings. The subsequent analyses include individuals of and control variables for all religious faiths, both large and small.
While the samples are too small to test how minority religions, such as Jews or Mormons, behave, the main results remain the same if they are included or excluded from the models.
For the larger religious faiths, however, I run a series of interaction analyses and replicate the main results excluding the large religious groups-mainline Protestants, Catholics, and evangelical Protestants-one at a time in order test whether the overall results are driven by one particular religious group. For all analyses, the results are not driven by one major religion, but rather apply broadly to (at least) the three main religious denominations. Although a wholesale Democratic shift to the cultural left was mitigated by the election 15 The three major religions make up approximately 90% of the first sample and 60% of the second sample.
of Democrat Jimmy Carter, the first born-again President, Republicans began to strategically court religious activists with a culturally conservative issue agenda (Himmelstein 1983; Oldfield 1996; Reichley 1987) . In the 1980 election, Ronald Reagan reached out devout voters-including members of Jerry Falwell's newly-formed Moral Majority and the Religious Roundtable-by emphasizing issues such as abortion, prayer in public school, subsidizing private religious education, and gay rights (Layman 2001; Miller and Wattenberg 1984; Oldfield 1996) . Reagan railed against federally-funded textbooks that taught "moral relativism", the Federal Communications Commission for trying to limit religious broadcasting, and the IRS for launching an "unconstitutional regulatory vendetta" against Christian schools (Williams 2010, 141-2).
The large-scale shifts in official party positions, candidate rhetoric, and the salience of moral issues mark the first instance in which the parties became known for being on opposing sides of the religious and cultural aisle. If we think partisanship can drive religious decisions, this would be the first time we should see this occurring. showing that religion becomes a peripheral concern as students leave home and begin to make a life for themselves. The right panel of Figure 3 is a partial residual plot, which shows the variation in church attendance (ordinal measure ranging between 0 and 1) due to partisanship after accounting for 1965 levels of church attendance and control variables that may be correlated with partisanship and changing religiosity. To understand the magnitude of the results, I compare the partisan results to a welldocumented explanation of religious involvement. A child's religious environment is a consistently strong predictor of her religiosity in adulthood. Individuals raised in religious house-17 Including policy attitudes as control variables raises concerns about whether individuals choose a partisan identification that matches their policy positions (which would make it important to control for policy preferences) or whether partisans adopt policy positions to match their partisanship (which might result in post-treatment bias on the partisanship variable). I run the model both with and without the policy control variables and the relationship between partisanship and religiosity remains the same.
Politics affecting religiosity for the first time
holds are more likely to be religious themselves (Kelly and De Graff 1997; Myers 1996) . I measure an individual's religious upbringing with a church attendance question asked of the parent generation in 1965. Students raised in households in which the parents attended church almost every week shifted 0.14 on the church attendance scale compared to those raised in homes where the parents did not attend church (p-value = 0.03), 0.09 compared to those raised in a home where the parents attended a few times per year (p-value = 0.03), and 0.06 compared to those who were raised in a home where the parents attended once or twice a month (p-value = 0.11). The gap that emerged between Republicans and Democrats is half the size of the gap that emerges between individuals raised in non-attending versus frequently attending households (0.07 versus 0.14). Partisanship's effect is noteworthy and its effect size meaningful in comparison to one's religious upbringing which represents an important predictor of religious identity in adulthood.
I replicate the same results among the parent generation in order to rule out the possibility that partisanship was driving changes in religious behaviors for everyone. If so, the results would be evidence of a period effect, not a life cycle effect which predicts that religious identities are stable in adulthood. Figure 4 replicates the findings for the parents' generation.
Not only are church attendance rates quite stable and the partisan attendance gap does not change statistically over time, the trend actually runs in the opposite direction: Republicans' reported church attendance declined slightly relative to Democrats.
Finally, how does political non-identification factor in? Although nearly half-48%-of this cohort initially reported not identifying as either a Republican or Democrat, nearly 60% of these initial independents leaned toward one party. Partisan leaners look virtually indistinguishable to those who readily identified as a partisan. While the analyses looking at the leaners produces more uncertainty around the point estimates due to the smaller sample size, the substantive take away is the same: Republicans (and Republican leaners) became more religious over time relative to Democrats (and Democratic leaners).
While the small number of pure Independents (20%) makes it difficult to provide defini-tive answers, two results are particularly suggestive. First, Independents attended church at a lower rate than both Democrats and Republicans in 1973, before religion became a salient political issue. If we think of both politics and religion as something that people join or identify with, it makes sense that political Independents are also more religiously independent. Second, Independents fall squarely between Democrats and Republicans on changing church attendance rates between 1973 and 1982. Independents returned to church at a slightly higher rate than Democrats (0.04) and a slightly lower rate than Republicans (0.03). Independents' moderate religious shift is consistent a general move toward religion at this time coupled with the political environment sending Republicans and Democrats opposite religious cues.
Although the YPSP allows me to track changes over much of one cohort's life, its strength is also its weakness. All cohorts are unique, and the graduating class of 1965 is especially so.
Men from this cohort could have been (and were) drafted, disaffiliation from the two main political parties was high, and this cohort was coming of age during a rapid transformation about attitudes related to race, sex, and drugs. In the next section, I replicate the main findings using a different sample in a different generation that experiences a different shift in the political landscape. 
2004: Gay marriage comes to the forefront

Alternative explanations
The results have thus far provided evidence in support of the life cycle theory. Political identities seemed to affect religious decisions at a specific time period in a person's life, and these decisions are felt even as these individuals grow older. Evidence in support of a theory, however, does not rule out alternative explanations. In this section, I present and discuss a series of plausible explanations. Detailed results from the analyses are in the Appendix.
What about religion affecting politics? Newly formed adults made religious choices consistent with their pre-existing political identities in both sets of data; however, it might also be the case that religious identities affected political attitudes during this time. would not be about religion but rather a broader life cycle trend of societal engagement. I test for this possibility by running a series of placebo tests using political and civic engagement questions. In the YPSP, I find no evidence of Republicans becoming more involved in politics, measured by voting rates and contacting elected officials, or other societal groups such as fraternal organizations, informal social groups, civic organizations, and professional groups.
22 While possible that some young, childless individuals have made the active decision to forgo children and already made decisions pertaining to their religious identities, Gallup (2013) findings that 87% of individuals aged 18-40 without children plan to have them in the future. It is still the overwhelming norm to plan on having children. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the majority in this subsample will try to become parents in the future. 
Discussion and Conclusion
This paper begins to explore how political and social identities interact, and how variation in identification strength can have meaningful effects on the development of and involvement with politically-relevant social identity groups. Using two types of analytic strategies, I show that partisanship can influence citizens' religious identities at a particular point in their lives.
The experiment offers a controlled test of how partisans answer standard demographic questions on religion after being encouraged to "think like a partisan." As the stimulus did not link religion and politics together, the results are from an especially difficult test that rely on how individuals themselves think about the religious-political landscape. Moreover, these results offer an important first test of the life cycle theory: individuals with theoretically weaker religious identities were more open to political influence.
I then test how, when the relationship between organized religion and politics changed, partisans' religious involvement also changed. The YPSP data offer what is likely the first evidence of partisanship affecting church attend, a defining behavioral characteristic of one's religious identity. Not only did partisanship affect decisions related to returning to religion, the effect was still evident when these respondents were 50 years old. I find partisanship affecting religiosity at the same time scholars have first found evidence of religiosity predicting partisanship and vote choice (Green 2010; Layman 2001; 1997) . The second set of observational findings-which uses the public debate about gay marriage-produced a similar set of results. Those theoretically most susceptible to partisanship's influence updated their religious responses to be consistent with their partisan identities.
These results begin to fill in the gaps that currently exist in the identity literature. First, rather than thinking about identities as exogenous variables that influence political attitudes and behaviors, these results demonstrate the need to think of identities as constructs whose strength varies over time and can be partially created by politics. As this paper shows, the emergence of the "God gap" is more complicated than academics and pundits initially thought. The simple explanation that secular and less religious people moved toward the Democrats while the devout made a home within the Republican camp excludes a key element. Democrats and Republicans also alter their religious identities to better fit with their chosen political party. Second, the theory and findings also help explain how multiple identities work together to create an overarching belief structure. We see strong and stable identity coalitions in the political realm that are slow to change because identities can reinforce each other. If partisans adopt the dominant religious identities of their political party, the relationship between religious and politics identities is reinforced and become stronger.
The results from this paper not only help explain the creation of our politico-religious landscape; it also affects its future. Church is a breeding ground for political mobilization and activism (Djupe and Gilbert 2009; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1994) . By Republicans Inactivity in religion, however, does not ignite the same levels of political fervor. Although secular humanist and atheist organizations exist, their membership and reach are minuscule compared to that of organized religion. This is largely driven by the fact that most nonidentifiers and non-religious people are not necessarily opposed to religion, nor do they have strong anti-religious tendencies. Rather, they simply happen to not be involved (Lim, MacGregor, and Putnam 2010) . In contrast to Republicans who can rally people under the banner of religion, the Democratic Party cannot use secularism to mobilize its members.
The result of politics affecting religion is that the bases of the two parties-as well as their ability to be energized-are now also different.
This paper approaches an old question about the relationship between religion and politics from a new angle. My theory and results not only show that a reverse relationship between religious and political attitudes exists but that researchers should not find such a relationship surprising. We must reconsider the conventional wisdom linking religion and politics together and begin thinking about the conditions under which different identities are likely to exert influence. .7
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